NATURALITÀ E INTENZIONALITÀ
IL RELAZIONISMO DI WHITEHEAD COME FILOSOFIA DELL’ESPERIENZA DI VITA

Luca Vanzago

This paper deals with a possible interpretation of the notion of intentionality in the light of Whitehead’s conception of nature and experience. In order to make this point, the paper recalls the canonical definition of intentionality, given by Franz Brentano, and then its modification by Husserl. These definitions will serve the purpose of providing a background against which to situate Whitehead’s own version. In Whitehead’s speculative philosophy, experience becomes the basic factor of the whole of reality. Thus, not only a different relationship between nature and consciousness is made possible, but, more radically, nature is experience itself, so that the very conflict between matter and soul, such as it was depicted by Brentano, becomes useless. It is possible at once to show that nature is experiencing and that experience is natural. Brentano’s dualism is then superseded “from within”, so to speak, that is, both by redefining nature and therefore by weakening the separation of nature and mind.